



STATION SHOOTING CLUB 2017

Building intelligence-driven Security Operations Center

Mariusz Stawowski, Ph.D.
CISSP, CCISO

25 years | **CLICO** 
© 1991 – 2017, CLICO.eu

Agenda

- How to build Security Operations Center?
- GDPR and NISD - new UE law for data, networks and IT systems protection
- How to protect and audit PII?
- How to efficiently manage the incidents?



Security Operations Center (SOC) - centralized unit that deals with security issues on an organizational (business) and technical level

Triad of Security Operations: People, Process and Technology



other names: Information Security Operations Center (ISOC), CyberSecurity Operations Center (CSOC), Security Defense Center (SDC), Security Analytics Center (SAC), Network Security Operations Center (NSOC), Security Intelligence Center (SIC), Cyber Security Center (CSC), Threat Defense Center (TDC), Security Intelligence and Operations Center (SIOC), Infrastructure Protection Centre (IPC)


SOC vs CERT, CSIRT

SOC types: Corporate SOC, Outsourced SOC, Cloud SOC

More information: „Building a World-Class Security Operations Center: A Roadmap”, SANS Institute 2015

© 1991 – 2017, CLICO.eu

SOC infrastructure






Why we need SOC?

- **Late detection of incidents** leads to serious security breaches
- Security management requires building **large team of security experts**
- Employee rotation is **risk of knowledge loss** by the organization
- IT documentation and other IT related **important data dispersed in many places**
- Difficulties in **understanding technical events in business context**
- Security **breach reporting requirements** of new UE law (eg GDPR, NISD)



Example of late incident detection – energy sector, Ukraine 2015





- Social engineering attack (email Phishing)
- The attached in email MS Office doc. installs BlackEnergy 3 malware
- **C&C access and recognition of IT environment (+6 months)**
- Obtaining data for remote access to ICS systems
- Remote access to ICS systems
- Installation of KillDisk malware
- DoS attack at Call Center

- The attack at the power distribution system (attack by HMI SCADA, resulting in a lack of energy at 225,000 customers)
- False ICS firmware makes difficult the systems recovery
- Turning off the systems backup power supply (UPS)
- Removing the traces of the attack (the removal of logs, destruction / locking systems, etc.)


More information: Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid, Defense Use Case, Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, SANS-ICS, March 18, 2016

Intelligence-Driven SOC



More information: The Five Characteristics of an Intelligence-Driven Security Operations Center, Gartner 2015


Threat Intelligence in SOC



More information: "The Pyramid of Pain" - David Bianco

Gartner's Top 10 Strategic Technology Trends for 2017

Artificial intelligence, machine learning, and smart things promise an intelligent future.



(...) Multilayered security and use of user and entity behavior analytics will become a requirement for virtually every enterprise.

More information:
<http://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/gartners-top-10-technology-trends-2017/>

Why EU cybersecurity law was tightened?



- GDPR: *designed to harmonize data privacy laws across Europe, to protect and empower all EU citizens data privacy and to reshape the way organizations across the region approach data privacy*
- NISD: *bring cybersecurity capabilities at the same level of development in all the EU Member States and ensure that exchanges of information and cooperation are efficient, including at cross-border level*
- **Other reasons:**
 - **Cybercrime is recognized risk for the economy**
 - **„Security is a cost“ approach = no real safety**
 - **„Security checklist“ approach = no real safety**

New UE law for data and IT systems protection



December 2015, EU Commission reached an agreement on new law for data and IT systems protection law:

- **General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)**

GDPR will give EU citizens stronger rights, empowering them with better control of their data and ensuring that their privacy remains protected.

- **Network and Information Security Directive (NISD)**

NISD is complementary to the GDPR, aimed at the protection of IT systems of operators of essential services and the providers of critical digital services.

New UE law for data and IT systems protection



| Regulation | GDPR | NISD |
|-------------------------------|---|---|
| Primary Goals | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Directive on protecting personal data processed for prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of criminal offenses ... | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Improve Member States' cooperation on cyber security.• Directive concerning measures to ensure a standard high level of network and information security across the EU. |
| Organizations Impacted | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Data controllers and data processors.• Essentially any organization with personal data. | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Operators of essential services in the energy, transport, banking and healthcare sectors.• Providers of critical digital services like search engines and cloud computing. |



New UE law for data and IT systems protection



| Regulation | GDPR | NISD |
|----------------|----------|---|
| Effective Date | May 2018 | May 2018 - Transposition into national law November 2018 - Member States to identify operators of essential services |

New UE law for data and IT systems protection



| Regulation | GDPR |
|---|---|
| Security technology requirements | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Data protection by design and by default (Article 25).• Security of processing (Article 32).• Breach notification (Article 33).• Data protection impact assessment (Article 35). |

Privacy by Design

'The controller shall..**implement appropriate technical and organisational measures..in an effective way..** in order to meet the requirements of this Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects'. Article 23 calls for controllers to hold and process only the data absolutely necessary for the completion of its duties (data minimisation), as well as limiting the access to personal data to those needing to act out the processing.

ISO/IEC standards relevant for PII protection

| | |
|----------------------------|--|
| ISO/IEC 29100:2011 | Privacy framework |
| ISO/IEC 29101: 2013 | Privacy architecture framework |
| ISO/IEC 29115:2013 | Entity authentication assurance framework |
| ISO/IEC 29134 | Privacy Impact Assessment - Methodology |
| ISO/IEC 29151 | Code of practice for PII protection |
| ISO/IEC 29190:2015 | Privacy capability assessment model |
| ISO/IEC 27018:2014 | Code of practice for PII protection in public clouds acting as PII processors |
| ISO/IEC TS 19608 | Guidance for developing security and privacy functional requirements based on ISO/IEC 15408 (Expected date of publication: 2017) |

New UE law for data and IT systems protection



| Regulation | GDPR | NISD |
|------------------------------------|---|--|
| Security breaches reporting | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Data breaches must be reported as soon as possible and, where feasible, no later than 72 hours after discovery of a breach• Regulation will apply to companies headquartered outside of Europe as long as they have operations in Europe• Data Transfers to third countries and international organizations may only be carried out in full compliance with this Regulation• Requires Data Protection Officer | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Requires operators of essential services in the energy, transport, banking and healthcare sectors, and providers of critical digital services like search engines and cloud computing, to take appropriate security measures and report incidents to the national authorities• Member States will also be required to designate a national competent authority for the implementation and enforcement of the Directive, as well as Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) responsible for handling incidents and risks |



New UE law for data and IT systems protection



| Regulation | GDPR |
|------------------|---|
| Penalties | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• GDPR states that all penalties must be effective, proportionate to the offense, and dissuasive, i.e.:<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Fine: 10,000,000 Euros or 2% Global Turnover, for offenses related to:<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Child consent;○ Transparency of information and communication;○ Data processing, security, storage, breach, breach notification; and○ Transfers related to appropriate safeguards and binding corporate rules.• Fine: 20,000,000 Euros or 4% of Global Turnover, for offenses related to:<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Data processing;○ Consent;○ Data subject rights;○ Non-compliance with DPR order; and○ Transfer of data to third party.• The penalty will be whichever number is greater, either the flat fine or the percentage of global turnover.• Global turnover applies to all sales of a company, net of taxes. GDPR authorizes penalties in the event of both material and non-material damages. |

ISSA: Practical Steps for Compliance with New EU Data Privacy Regulations

1. Locate the data

2. Define access

3. Identify and manage security risks

Avoid the “checklist” approach to security

More information: ISSA Journal February 2017, Patrick Looney, "Practical Steps for Compliance with New EU Data Privacy Regulations".

Practical Steps for Compliance with New EU Data Privacy Regulations

1. Locate the data

It is important to understand the data within the organization by knowing the range of data formats that contain personal information (e.g., databases, file storages, backups, multimedia files, metadata associated with image files, etc.).

Practical Steps for Compliance with New EU Data Privacy Regulations

2. Define access

“High standard of protection” for personal data and this standard to be maintained across the enterprise, which includes third parties and operations in other countries.


Practical Steps for Compliance with New EU Data Privacy Regulations

3. Identify and manage security risks

The companies need to understand the security risks and the threats associated with these risks versus how their controls and measures are performing; the combination of these two factors gives the ability to quantify risk and identify areas for improvement and investment.

How to protect PII?

Defense-in-Depth



Quick GDPR audit

| | | |
|----|---|--|
| 1. | Intentional or accidental leakage of personal data due to employees' fault | Security Awareness Next-Gen Firewall DLP |
| 2. | Leakage of personal data due to malware infection on employees' computers | Next-Gen Firewall Anti-Virus Sandboxing Endpoint security Data Encryption ... |

Quick GDPR audit

| | | |
|----|---|---|
| 3. | Leakage of personal data as a result of hacking into Web application | WAF - Web Application Firewall |
| 4. | Leakage of personal data as a result of hacking into database | DBFW - Database Firewall DB Encryption |
| 5. | Leakage of personal data as a result of hacking into file server | File Firewall File Encryption |

Quick GDPR audit

| | | |
|----|--|--|
| 6. | Leakage of personal data as a result of hacking into mobile device | MDM - Mobile Device Management |
| 7. | Leakage of personal data as a result of hacking into privileged user account | PAS - Privileged Account Security |
| 8. | Leakage of personal data as a result of unauthorized VPN/RAS access | Strong User Authentication |
| 9. | Leakage of personal data as a result of hacking or unauthorized use of cloud applications | CASB - Cloud Access Security Broker |

Encryption as recommended PII protection

- **Comprehensive Data Protection**
 - VM Instance (ProtectV)
 - File, Directory, Partition (ProtectFile)
 - Database (ProtectDB)
 - Application (ProtectApp)
 - Network (High Speed Encryptor)
- **Centralized Key Management (KeySecure)**
- **Secure Key Storage (Luna Hardware Security Module)**



Run workloads securely in a multi-tenant environment



Safe decommission of data



Separation of duties between cloud service provider, storage, security and other administrators



Meet compliance and regulatory mandates

Encryption as recommended PII protection

Vormetric Data Security Manager (DSM)

Many deployment forms:

- Virtual Appliance
- Physical Appliance (FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Certified)
- Physical Appliance with HSM (FIPS 140-2 Level 3 Certified)



- Manage Key's
- Manage Policy's
- Audit Access
- Encryption
- Strong (AES 256)
- Transparent (MetaClear™, US Pat)



THALES




25 years | CLICO 
© 1991 – 2017, CLICO.eu

PII protection in databases


“Need to Know” principle difficult to execute for the users in databases

- Often, multiple databases in the organization, developed independently
- Often, the user accounts in the applications different then in the databases
- Often, the access rights are defined in many places (e.g. in different apps and databases)



PII protection in databases


Privileged users (e.g. system administrators, database administrators, application administrators, application developers, technical support, auditors) often have unlimited access (and practically uncontrolled) to PII and other sensitive data.



PII protection in databases

Maintaining the database security is difficult

- Many attack vectors (exploit, SQL-I, privilege misuse, etc.)



- Problems installing security patches in production databases

Imperva Web Security

By analyzing traffic, SecureSphere automatically learns...

| Name | Value Type | Min | Max | Expected user input |
|-----------|------------------|-----|-----|---------------------|
| Address | Latin Characters | 3 | 50 | |
| CCDate | Numeric | 4 | 8 | |
| CCNumber | Numeric | 15 | 18 | |
| Country | Latin Characters | 2 | 25 | |
| Email | Latin Characters | 4 | 28 | |
| FirstName | Latin Characters | 1 | 20 | |
| LastName | Latin Characters | 2 | 25 | |
| Password1 | Latin Characters | 1 | 15 | |
| Password2 | Latin Characters | 1 | 15 | |
| PhoneNum | Numeric | 7 | 13 | |
| Username | | | | |

So it can alert on or block abnormal requests

- Conventional protections like FW/UTM and IPS are not able to protect against specific Web attacks (eg SQL-I)
- **The only effective Web security solution is Web Application Firewall (WAF)**

Imperva Database Security

IMPERVA®

- **SecureSphere Database Activity Monitoring**
 - + Full auditing and visibility into database data usage
- **SecureSphere Database Firewall**
 - + Activity monitoring and real-time protection for critical databases
- **SecureSphere Discovery and Assessment Server**
 - + Vulnerability assessment, configuration management, database discovery and classification
- **User Rights Management for Databases**
 - + Review and manage user access rights to sensitive databases
- **ADC Insights for SAP, Oracle EBS and PeopleSoft**
 - + Pre-packaged reports and rules for SAP, Oracle EBS and PeopleSoft compliance and security



© 1991 – 2017, CLICO.eu

Detailed Audit Trail

SecureSphere automates the creation of a continuous audit process

| Complete Audit Trail | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|---------------|------|----------------|------------------------|--------------------|------------------------------------|
| Event Date and Time | Source IP | User | Destination IP | Service | Source Application | Query |
| User: erez (7) | | | | | | |
| June 10, 2010 5:09:54 PM | 192.168.0.110 | erez | 11.11.199.122 | Solaris Oracle Service | sqlplusw.exe | CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION MYFUNC |
| June 10, 2010 5:09:01 PM | 192.168.0.110 | erez | 11.11.199.122 | Solaris Oracle Service | sqlplusw.exe | select * from table_users |
| June 10, 2010 5:08:51 PM | 192.168.0.110 | erez | 11.11.199.122 | Solaris Oracle Service | sqlplusw.exe | SELECT ATTRIBUTE,SCOPE,NUMERIC VAL |
| June 10, 2010 5:08:51 PM | 192.168.0.110 | erez | 11.11.199.122 | Solaris Oracle Service | sqlplusw.exe | SELECT CHAR VALUE FROM SYSTEM.PRO |
| June 10, 2010 5:07:22 PM | 192.168.0.110 | erez | 11.11.199.122 | Solaris Oracle Service | sqlplusw.exe | SELECT ATTRIBUTE,SCOPE,NUMERIC VAL |
| June 10, 2010 5:07:22 PM | 192.168.0.110 | erez | 11.11.199.122 | Solaris Oracle Service | sqlplusw.exe | SELECT CHAR VALUE FROM SYSTEM.PRO |
| June 10, 2010 4:58:55 PM | 192.168.0.110 | erez | 11.11.199.122 | Solaris Oracle Service | sqlplusw.exe | SELECT "SPW LANGUAGE","SPW WORD", |
| User: foo (18) | | | | | | |
| March 31, 2010 10:44:49 PM | 10.77.126.93 | foo | 11.11.199.122 | Solaris Oracle Service | sqlplusw.exe | drop table testpriv |
| March 31, 2010 10:44:41 PM | 10.77.126.93 | foo | 11.11.199.122 | Solaris Oracle Service | sqlplusw.exe | truncate table testpriv |

When? Who? Where? How? What?

Real-Time, Detailed Alerts

Detailed Alert

Event 6825124730413141822: Unauthorized Source Application

| | |
|-----------------------|--|
| Key | Value |
| Violation Description | Unauthorized Source Application microsoft sql server management studio express - query by veda_app from 10.77.128.53 |
| Violated Item | User: veda_app , Source Application: microsoft sql server management studio express - query |

Event Details:

| | | | | |
|--|--|--|---------|------------|
| Event Time | Gateway | | | |
| June 1, 2010 5:28:28 AM | Dot97 | | | |
| Server Group | Service | Application | | |
| MS SQL OldSuperVeda DB SG | MS SQL OldSuperVeda DB Service | Default MsSql Application | | |
| Connection | User | DB Application | OS User | OS Host |
| 10.77.128.53:1149 → 11.11.199.102:1433 | veda_app | microsoft sql server management studio express - query | | t400-devin |
| Affected Rows | Response Size | Response Time | | |
| 0 | 0 Records | 24 msec. | | |
| Error Code | Error Message | | | |
| 208 | Invalid object name 'ccstart'. | | | |
| select 12345 from ccstart | | | | |
| Enrichment Data: | | | | |
| User Defined Field | | | | |
| SalesAdmin | | | | |
| Additional Violations: | | | | |
| Violation Name | Violation Description | | | |
| Unauthorized Database Schema | Unauthorized Database Schema by veda_app | | | |

When?

Where?

Who?

General description:

How?

What?

Why?

Identifying Abnormal Behaviors


- Usage profile built for each user to represent 'normal behaviour'
- Continuously updates → significantly reduces manual updates
- Profile deviations create an alert and can be blocked

| Object | Sensitivity | Observed 'Normal' Access | | | |
|---------------------|-------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| | | select | update | insert | delete |
| Table | | | | | |
| <u>categories</u> | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <u>countries</u> | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <u>messages</u> | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <u>orders</u> | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <u>prodsinorder</u> | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <u>products</u> | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <u>sales</u> | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <u>states</u> | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <u>sysxlogins</u> | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Auditing Local Privileged Activity


IMPERVA

- SecureSphere utilizes lightweight agents to monitor database activity performed locally on the database server
- The agents eliminate blind spots by monitoring internal network communications
- The agents send the data to the appliance where it is parsed analyzed and stored in the audit trail
- The agent is completely independent of the RDBMS



Performance Management

IMPERVA[®]




Built in views provide a summary of monitored activities and drill down capabilities into the specific details.


Imperva CounterBreach

User Behavior Analytics in databases and cloud

IMPERVA



How to manage the incidents?



More information: "Computer Security Incident Handling Guide", NIST 2012

How to manage the incidents?




More information: "Incident Handler's Handbook", SANS Institute 2011

How to manage the incidents?



European Union Agency for
Network and Information Security




More information: "Strategies for incident response and cyber crisis cooperation", ENISA 2016



© 1991 – 2017, CLICO.eu

How to manage the incidents?

1. Incident Identification
2. Triage
3. Classification
4. Notification
5. Containment
6. Evidence Collection
7. Chain of Custody
8. Eradication
9. Recovery
10. Forensics Analysis
11. Root Cause Analysis
12. Lessons Learned




Legacy SIEM

- and when the destination port is one of the following 53
- and when the IP protocol is one of the following UDP.udp ip
- and when the source packet rate is greater than 3 packets/second
- and NOT when the source IP is one of the following 10.1.75.10/32

- and when the source IP is one of the following 10.1.11.0/24
- and when the event category for the event is one of the following Access.Access Denied, Access.ACL Deny

- and when the source IP is one of the following 10.1.75.10/32
- and NOT when the destination IP is one of the following 10.1.11.200/32
- and NOT when the destination port is one of the following 22




Manually added and updated rules, IP addresses, port numbers, etc.



© 1991 – 2017, CLICO.eu

„The Coming UBA / UEBA – SIEM War!” - Gartner




More information: <http://blogs.gartner.com/anton-chuvakin/2016/11/07/the-coming-uba-ueba-siem-war/>


How to manage the incidents?

Legacy
SIEM
(static rules)

Legacy
IDS/IPS
(patterns)



Network Behavior Analysis



LAN/WAN with FlowMon Probes or NetFlow compatible devices

NetFlow Export



FlowMon Collector



Network Visibility
Traffic Monitoring



Network Security
Anomaly Detection



Troubleshooting
Network Optimization



Alerting, Reporting
Billing & Accounting





© 1991 – 2017, CLICO.eu

Network Behavior Analysis (NBA)




- Creates profiles of normal computers behavior from flows read from the network devices (as well as SPAN ports and network taps)
- Identifies security incidents based on deviations from the behavior profiles and typical anomalies (e.g. DNS tunneling, port scanning, C&C connections)



Network Behavior Analysis (NBA)



Flowmon ADS



| # | Zdrojová IP | Typ udlosti | Detail | Čas | Zdroj NetFlow | Cíle |
|---|----------------|-------------|--|---------------------|---------------|--|
| 1 | 112.90.18.105 | LSANOMALY | The traffic not belonging to any internal network was detected (this may indicate spoofing). Transferred: 2.66 MB, packets: 65 559. | 2013-08-24 07:15:21 | localhost | 1.52.6.170, 1.52.13.199, 1.52.42.167, 1.52.59.1.52.71.217, 1.52.87.249, 1.52.133.226, 1.52.1.52.190.113, 1.52.218.16, ... |
| 2 | 112.91.30.17 | LSANOMALY | The traffic not belonging to any internal network was detected (this may indicate spoofing). Transferred: 2.37 MB, packets: 58 379. | 2013-08-24 07:15:21 | localhost | 1.52.54.212, 1.52.109.106, 1.52.167.73, 1.52.1.52.199.229, 1.52.218.123, 1.52.220.241, 1.52.1.52.241.199, 1.52.8.41, ... |
| 3 | 121.10.112.17 | LSANOMALY | The traffic not belonging to any internal network was detected (this may indicate spoofing). Transferred: 2.27 MB, packets: 58 266. | 2013-08-24 07:15:21 | localhost | 1.52.1.176, 1.52.2.100, 1.52.7.105, 1.52.44.16, 1.52.77.224, 1.52.128.196, 1.52.128.214, 1.52.1.52.199.181, 1.52.241.170, ... |
| 4 | 183.61.138.105 | LSANOMALY | The traffic not belonging to any internal network was detected (this may indicate spoofing). Transferred: 2.66 MB, packets: 65 415. | 2013-08-24 07:15:21 | localhost | 1.52.58.25, 1.52.85.224, 1.52.86.18, 1.52.92.1.52.174.104, 1.52.183.10, 1.52.184.230, 1.52.1.52.238.245, 1.52.44.63, 1.52.112.109, 1.52.1.52.177.97, 1.52.40.147, 1.52.56.10, 1.52.89.1.53.122.157, 1.53.221.26, ... |
| 5 | 210.73.221.181 | LSANOMALY | The traffic not belonging to any internal network was detected (this may indicate spoofing). Transferred: 2.36 MB, packets: 58 086. | 2013-08-24 07:15:21 | localhost | 1.52.4.138, 1.52.12.103, 1.52.28.61, 1.52.21.7, 1.52.42.130, 1.52.44.24, 1.52.48.142, 1.52.67.1.52.122.10, 1.53.221.26, ... |
| 6 | 112.90.18.105 | LSANOMALY | The traffic not belonging to any internal network was detected (this may indicate spoofing). Transferred: 5.04 MB, packets: 125 924. | 2013-08-24 05:39:59 | localhost | 1.52.7.220, 1.52.11.109, 1.52.28.57, 1.52.42.9.1.52.95.134, 1.52.144.14, 1.52.115.205, 1.53.1.52.122.10, ... |
| 7 | 112.90.18.105 | LSANOMALY | The traffic not belonging to any internal network was detected (this may indicate spoofing). Transferred: 3.60 MB, packets: 88 749. | 2013-08-24 03:38:31 | localhost | 1.52.12.16, 1.52.77.184, 1.52.104.14, 1.52.12.1.52.128.99, 1.52.124.15, 1.52.137.109, 1.52.1.52.203.143, 1.52.209.197, ... |
| 8 | 112.90.18.105 | LSANOMALY | The traffic not belonging to any internal network was detected (this may indicate spoofing). Transferred: 2.60 MB, packets: 63 126. | 2013-08-24 03:00:34 | localhost | 1.52.12.16, 1.52.77.184, 1.52.104.14, 1.52.12.1.52.128.99, 1.52.124.15, 1.52.137.109, 1.52.1.52.203.143, 1.52.209.197, ... |




Key facts about Flowmon



1. Creates **profiles of normal computers behavior** from flows read from the network devices
2. Identifies security **incidents based on deviations** from the behavior profiles
3. Detects **incidents automatically**, no need for writing of correlation rules
4. It does **not require installation of the agents** on user computers
5. Useful in incident management as well as **application performance monitoring and network troubleshooting**

User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA / UBA)



Creates profiles of normal user behavior from logs

| CURRENT | | |
|-------------------|--|--------------|
| 9 Watchlist Users | | |
| | Barbara Salazar • Human Resources Coordinator | SCORE 217 |
| | Gary Hardin • Software Engineer | SCORE 130 |
| | Boyce Archer Software Developer | SCORE 50 |
| | Selma Henson Security Security Coordinator | SCORE 50 |

6:04PM
VPN login from Ukraine

6:17PM
Remote access to `srv_117jk_us`

8:28PM
Database operation : login on `srv_sql05`



UEBA / UBA



From 2013



2015 Gartner Cool Vendor
Security Intelligence



2016 IBM Beacon Award
Outstanding Security
Solution



Network World Asia,
Information Management
Awards 2016
Most Promising User Behavior
Analytics Solution



Network Products Guide IT World Awards 2016
Gold – Innovative Company of the Year
Gold – Hot Companies
Silver – New Products and Services
Silver – Best IT Company of the Year (Software)
Bronze – Insider Threat Detection and Solutions
Bronze – Startup of the year (founded 2013)

Co-Founder



Shlomo Kramer



Silicon Review Top 10
Analytics Companies



Dark Reading Top 20
Cyber Security Startup



CRN Emerging Vendor Awards 2015
Winner—Emerging Security Vendor
Award



Cyber Security Excellence Awards 2016
Finalist—Most Innovative Cybersecurity
Company



© 1991 – 2017, CLICO.eu


Key facts about Exabeam




1. Creates **profiles of normal user behavior** from logs read from SIEM and other data sources
2. Identifies security **incidents based on deviations** from the user behavior profiles
3. Detects **incidents not visible to SIEM**, including security breaches with passwords stolen for legitimate users
4. Provides **easy-to-understand and easy-to-proof evidence** of the incident, including list of specific user actions
5. It does **not require installation of the agents** on user computers
6. It can **operate with SIEM or replace it** with its own Log Management System

SOC: Identify and manage security risks

Avoid serious breaches





SAFE





VULNERABLE

- Errors in operating systems, applications, databases, etc.
- Errors in hardware, software, configuration, human factor, etc.



INCIDENT

- Malware/intruder takes control over the system
- Hardware failure
- DoS attack



BREACH

- Disruption of business processes
- Leakage of confidential data
- Loss of image and customer confidence
- Legal consequences

Mitigate serious vulnerabilities

25 years | **CLICO** 

© 1991 – 2017, CLICO.eu